What’s in It for Me? Reciprocal Exchanges between Underwriters and Venture Capitalists by Miller, Douglas R. et al.
New England Journal of
Entrepreneurship
Volume 18
Number 2 2015 Eastern Academy of Management
Conference Special Issue
Article 2
2015
What’s in It for Me? Reciprocal Exchanges between
Underwriters and Venture Capitalists
Douglas R. Miller
Virginia Commonwealth University, millerdr@uncw.edu
Tera L. Galloway
Illinois State University, lgallo@ilstu.edu
Dustin B. Smith
Webster University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje
Part of the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons
This Refereed Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Jack Welch College of Business at DigitalCommons@SHU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in New England Journal of Entrepreneurship by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@SHU. For more information, please contact
ferribyp@sacredheart.edu, lysobeyb@sacredheart.edu.
Recommended Citation
Miller, Douglas R.; Galloway, Tera L.; and Smith, Dustin B. (2015) "What’s in It for Me? Reciprocal Exchanges between Underwriters
and Venture Capitalists," New England Journal of Entrepreneurship: Vol. 18 : No. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.sacredheart.edu/neje/vol18/iss2/2
 WHAT’S IN IT FOR ME?    11 
What’s in It for Me? Reciprocal Exchanges between Underwriters 
and Venture Capitalists    
 
Douglas R. Miller  
Tera L. Galloway   
Dustin Smith    
I 
n this article, we examine the impact of repeat interac-
tions between VCs and underwriters. Past research 
has suggested that such interactions build trust and 
may contribute to more equitable treatment of issuing 
firms. We adopt an alternative perspective and suggest that 
these repeat interactions are characterized by reciprocal ex-
changes facilitated by opportunistic behavior from the VC. 
Our analysis demonstrates that VCs and underwriters inter-
act in order to appropriate greater value from the IPO. This 
article provides a more complete understanding of repeat inter-
actions between the VC and the underwriter by identifying 
characteristics of the relationship that have an impact on the 
value of the IPO. 
Keywords: repeat interactions, IPO, reciprocal  
exchanges, VC 
 
Venture backing provides important resources for 
entrepreneurs as they progress through the stages of 
new venture startup (Jindra & Leshchinskii, 2015). In 
addition to financing, VC firms provide managerial 
expertise and guidance that has been shown to en-
hance start-up success (Jindra & Leshchinskii, 2015). 
Highly reputable VCs have been shown to be more 
successful in leading firms to an initial public offer-
ing (IPO) (Nahata, 2008). It is no surprise, then, that 
VC firms have a large presence in the IPO market. 
Nearly 40 percent of IPOs were venture backed over 
the time period 1994–2007. Despite the obvious 
benefits associated with venture backing, evidence 
has shown that venture-backed IPOs experience 
greater underpricing than non-venture backed IPOs  
(Lee & Wahal, 2004). Underpricing refers to the dif-
ference between the price at which shares are sold 
pre-IPO and the price at which the shares trade once 
issued to the market.  
We adopt an agency perspective to explain the 
presence of reciprocal exchanges between under-
writers and VCs. We suggest that top VCs establish 
reciprocal exchanges with underwriters as a way to 
gain more immediate access to investment gains 
through shorter lockup periods. VCs maintain port-
folio firms that are growing toward a potential IPO. 
In order to appropriate the most value from an IPO 
event, VCs seek to issue shares at a high price with 
minimal underpricing. Such an approach benefits 
both the entrepreneur and the VC: the entrepreneur 
because less money is left on the table, and the VC 
because they receive a higher return from their in-
vestment.  
Top venture capitalists act, in a way, as gatekeepers 
of an underwriter’s involvement in future IPOs. The 
influence that venture capitalists have on portfolio 
firms heavily impacts which underwriters are invited to 
participate. Following this logic, if an IPO is substan-
tially underpriced, VCs are positioned to punish the 
underwriter by excluding them from future business 
with their IPO firms (Bradley, Kim, & Krigman, 
2015). Despite this position to enact retributive justice, 
examinations show that VC firms do not actually pun-
ish underwriters for high underpricing. In fact, evi-
dence shows that underwriters that engage in under-
pricing actually gain more access to IPO firms not less 
(Ritter & Welch, 2002). We attempt to explain why 
such relationships persist and to examine the possible 
implications for the entrepreneur. 
Previous research has provided several explana-
tions for underpricing, including, the belief that VCs 
agree to underpricing as payment for all-star analyst 
coverage (Bradley et al., 2015, 2011; Liu, Arthurs, 
Nam, & Mousa, 2013), that underpricing is the result 
of asymmetric information (Jenkinson & Jones, 
2009), that it is a signal of issuing firm quality 
(Kennedy, Sivakumar, & Vetzal, 2006), a mechanism 
to intensify price momentum so that VCs can cash 
out at a higher price (Bradley et al., 2015), or that VC 
grandstanding encourages greater underpricing (Lee 
& Wahal, 2004). These positions do not fully explain 
why top VCs, which are capable of negotiating a suc-
cessful public offering without relying heavily on un-
derwriters, are willing to accept such high levels of 
underpricing.   
In this article, we focus on repeat exchanges to 
explain the prevalence of underpricing of IPO firms. 
We suggest that VCs and underwriters engage in re-
ciprocal exchanges, which present immediate benefits 
to both the VC and the underwriter, create greater 
trust, and contribute to the formation of long-term 
relationships. Additionally, we argue that when there 
is an established history between the VC and under-
writer, and VCs act in their own self-interest the ex-
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changes become more costly to the entrepreneurial 
firm when the proceeds from the IPO increase. Addi-
tionally, we suggest that VCs having higher reputa-
tions further exacerbate this behavior.  
This article contributes to agency theory by 
providing insights on how self-interested intermedi-
aries affect the IPO process. Agency costs associated 
with IPO have traditionally focused on underwriters 
and largely ignored self-interest seeking from the VC 
firm. Our study provides insight into how the most 
powerful VCs, those with substantial experience and 
a strong reputation, enhance their returns through 
increased underpricing and a shortened lockup. Our 
results make a practical contribution to entrepre-
neurs pursuing relationships with VC firms and pro-
vide a conceptual contribution to the IPO literature 
by highlighting the role that VCs play in underpric-
ing decisions.  
 
The IPO and Repeat Exchanges 
Agency theory research has been used to examine 
conflicts of interest that occur between investors in 
mergers and acquisitions (Masulis & Nahata, 2009; 
Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008) and, more recently, be-
tween parties involved in the analysis of VCs’ port-
folio firms approaching IPO (Jenkinson & Jones, 
2009).  Studies have shown that conflicts of interest 
do exist, but researchers have struggled to find direct 
evidence that shows that the IPO valuation and allo-
cations are a result of these conflicts of interest 
(Reuter, 2006; Ritter & Zhang, 2007). As a result, 
discussions of agency issues in the IPO process are 
often focused more on the underwriter and inci-
dences of underpricing than on the venture capital 
firms involved in moving the portfolio firm toward 
IPO.  
In order to understand the impact that the inter-
mediaries have on firms going through IPO, it is 
important to understand why firms choose to go 
through an IPO in the first place. There are a num-
ber of explanations to present as possible reasons 
for such a decision. Many firms choose to go public 
after recognizing the high-value market opportuni-
ties that exist. Successful entrepreneurial firms may 
reach a point where it is possible to establish a com-
petitive advantage through a favorable market-to-
book ratio. When these advantages are recognized, 
the likelihood of an IPO increases (Pagano & Panet-
ta, 1998). As such, much of the decision making re-
garding whether to go through with an IPO is based 
on the market and whether the IPO will create the 
resources necessary to improve the firm’s competi-
tive position, especially considering the additional 
competitive pressures that issuing firms face from 
incumbents in the market (Hsu, Reed, & Rocholl, 
2010).  Firms that have already established a com-
petitive strategy and have achieved a sustainable per-
formance are more likely to remain privately traded 
(Hsu et al., 2010). 
Following IPO, the issuing firm is recapitalized, 
leading to a reduced debt-to-equity ratio, which in-
creases the flexibility in the investments that the is-
suing firm is able to make. This suggests that firms 
choose to go public in order to gain access to the 
resources necessary for the IPO firm to respond 
more effectively to the changes in the market (Hsu 
et al., 2010). The IPO, by default, serves as a signal 
of high quality (Stoughton, Wong, & Zechner, 2001) 
and suggests that the issuing firm maintains greater 
stores of knowledge capital that present an ad-
vantage over competitors (Cockburn & Griliches, 
1988).  
Venture capitalists provide valuable capabilities to 
the firm during the IPO process, including the abili-
ties necessary to manage venture growth efficiently, 
define strategic advantages, and identify high-value 
opportunities (Ivanov & Masulis, 2008). VCs also 
maintain necessary ties with other influential interme-
diaries, including the underwriters that have a con-
sistent presence in the IPO market.  
The motivations of all parties involved in the 
IPO are very similar. The new venture VC and the 
underwriter want to appropriate the greatest amount 
of value from the IPO process (He, Cordeiro, & 
Shaw, 2015). However, the long-term outcomes vary 
significantly for the parties involved. Repeat ex-
changes between the VC and the underwriter can 
create a situation where the bargaining power shifts 
to favor the VC and underwriter to the detriment of 
the entrepreneur.  Despite the belief that the devel-
opment of relationships can resolve these issues, a 
number of studies have shown a connection be-
tween misaligned incentives of equity underwriters 
and excessive IPO underpricing (Baron, 1982; 
Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, 2003; Loughran & Ritter, 
2004; Loughran & Ritter, 2002; Nimalendran, Ritter, 
& Zhang, 2007; Reuter, 2006). Questions remain 
concerning this high level of underpricing and ef-
forts have been made to explain why this underpric-
ing would be accepted by the issuing firm and the 
VC firm that is backing the IPO.  
We suggest that promised access to greater 
wealth incentivizes the VC firm to accept greater 
underpricing. Such agreements would suggest that 
reciprocal relationships between the VC and the un-
derwriter indicate that agency costs may actually in-
crease when partnering with VCs and underwriters 
that have an established long-term, trusted relation-
ship. This perspective proposes that the lack of im-
mediate trust between parties may actually benefit 
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the issuing firm because it will allow the market to 
assign firm value more accurately. Additionally, 
when repeat exchanges are a characteristic of the 
market, it is unlikely that breaches of conduct will 
occur from the beginning of the relationship because 
the loss of social capital would be too great (Molm, 
Schaefer, & Collett, 2007).  
Hypothesis Development 
The repeat interactions that occur between VCs and 
underwriters creates an environment that may in-
crease agency costs to the entrepreneur. VCs have 
power in the selection of underwriters for their port-
folio firms and, as a result, have the potential to cre-
ate repeat relationships with underwriters that max-
imize their wealth appropriation. This relationship is 
further complicated by underwriters that are moti-
vated to keep a strong relationship with venture cap-
italists in order to improve the likelihood that they 
will be selected to act as underwriters on future ven-
tures that the VC firm has invested in. This motiva-
tion to build and keep strong ties means that invest-
ments banks reciprocate the benefits provided by 
the venture capital firm (Bradley et al., 2015). The 
establishment of long-term relationships between 
underwriters and venture capital firms can serve as 
an additional method for affecting the IPO process. 
This happens through two main channels.  
First, relationships tend to reduce the information 
asymmetries through access to potentially private in-
formation that allows underwriters to better assess 
the quality of the VC’s portfolio firms as well as gain 
a better understanding of the influence that the VC 
has in the decision making of portfolio firms. For 
instance, according to Baum and Silverman (2004), a 
VCs involvement in the IPO can act as a signal of 
quality when unambiguous measures of performance 
from other sources do not exist. Underwriters that 
have developed a lasting relationship with these VCs 
are in a more advantageous position to receive these 
signals and to capitalize on the information that is 
presented.  This is especially true when the infor-
mation provided by the VC is relevant for the evalua-
tion of other firms in the VC’s portfolio and is diffi-
cult for outsiders to gain access to.  
Second, long-term relationships may impact the 
prevalence of agency issues in the transaction. VCs 
and underwriters have a long-term presence in the 
IPO market and must maintain relationships in order 
to gain access to new deals that can produce future 
revenue. The long-term nature of the relationship and 
the need to maintain strong moral capital would sug-
gest that VCs would be more incentivized to provide 
accurate information to underwriters and underwrit-
ers would be more inclined to provide a fair appraisal 
of the offering.   
Due to the lockup restriction imposed on VCs, 
wealth lost through underpricing is of less concern to 
the VC than the value of the stock when the lockup 
period expires. As a result, VCs are most interested 
in decreasing the lockup period so that they can ben-
efit from investments more quickly. We propose that 
VCs agree to greater underpricing in exchange for 
the immediate reciprocation of a shortened lockup. 
Specifically, VC firms are desirous to capitalize on 
their investment more quickly and can only do so 
when the lockup expires (Bradley et al., 2015; 2011). 
We propose that the exchange central to the recipro-
cal exchanges agreement is the VC firm’s acceptance 
of greater underpricing in exchange for a shorter 
lockup period.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Greater underpricing will negatively 
impact the length of the lockup period. 
 
An underwriter has an incentive to please its 
institutional investors by underpricing more so that 
they will be loyal for future deals.  Institutional in-
vestors can buy at the offer price and then flip the 
shares for a profit at the end of the first trading day.  
In this situation, the institutional investors are re-
warded for their loyalty and the pre-IPO investors 
receive much less capital from the offering (Arthurs, 
Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Johnson, 2008). Gains are 
most pronounced when investors are involved in a 
large offering that produces considerable financial 
benefit. As a result, underwriters are very interested 
in gaining access to high-value IPOs in order to 
maintain strong relationships with institutional in-
vestors. In order to gain access to a sizeable offer-
ing, underwriters will reciprocate by agreeing to a 
shorter lockup period. As a result, we argue that 
VCs will receive a shorter lockup when providing 
underwriters access to high-value IPOs. This is pro-
posed in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The size of the offering will be nega-
tively related to the lockup period. 
VC Reputation 
A characteristic of the relationship between the VC 
and underwriter that has been largely ignored is the 
influence that VCs have in their portfolio firm’s 
choice of underwriter (Ince, 2011). We propose that 
repeat interactions occur as a result of the VC’s in-
fluence and underwriters that desire access to a spe-
cific VC’s portfolio firms must offer incentives to 
the VC in the short term, not just in the rent gener-
ated after market.  
Underwriters benefit from relationships with 
top venture capitalists because of the influence that 
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venture capitalists have on portfolio firms. The most 
active, reputable VCs, akin to top underwriters, have 
market power and underwriters maintain a strong 
relationship with these VCs by agreeing to shorter 
lockups. Importantly, these relationships are not de-
fined by a single “deal” but persist over time. This 
long-term relationship means that incentives may 
actually occur at a future IPO rather than the current 
IPO. As a result, underwriters are motivated to 
maintain long-term relationships with highly reputa-
ble VCs in order to continue being selected as the 
portfolio firm’s underwriter. We argue that more 
reputable VCs will be consistently presented with a 
shorter lockup period as a result of their influential 
position over portfolio firms.   
 
Hypothesis 3: The reputation of the VC firm will be 
negatively related to the length of the lockup period. 
Methodology  
Sample  
To test these hypotheses, we collected a random 
sample of firms that went through an IPO between 
1997 and 2007. We used the Securities Data Corpo-
ration (SDC) Platinum Database to identify these 
firms and gather supporting data. The SDC collects 
data from publicly available sources including news-
paper and wire sources, SEC filings, trade publica-
tions, and firm prospectuses. Additionally, we used 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP to gather financial infor-
mation. The final sample consisted of 236 U.S. IPO 
firms in the 31 different industries.  
 
Measures 
Dependent variables.  Benefits to the venture capi-
tal firm are measured using the agreed upon lockup 
period. Lockup is defined as the agreement between 
current shareholders and the underwriter that pre-
vents current shareholders from selling their shares 
of stock for a designated period of time following 
the IPO (Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson, & Johnson, 
2009). A single IPO firm may have different lockup 
period agreements with its underwriter, meaning that 
some shareholders face different restrictions from 
other shareholders. To accommodate for these dif-
ferences in the lockup agreement, lockup period was 
calculated as a weighted average of the number of 
days covered by the restricted selling period (Arthurs 
et al., 2009).  The formula is as follows: 
 
(Lockup period1 x Shares in lockup1) + (Lockup period2 x Shares in lockup2) 
(Shares in lockup1 + Shares in lockup2) 
 
 
Constructing the variable in this fashion means 
that when, for example, there are four VCs in the 
syndicate and each has a different lockup, the lockup 
is calculated according to the impact that the lockup 
has. A VC with greater ownership and a shorter 
lockup would weigh the formula differently from a 
VC with less ownership and a shorter lockup. This 
approach is more appropriate for understanding the 
impact that lockup periods have on the firm and 
whether these lockup periods are a result of recipro-
cal agreements. 
 
Independent variables. Underpricing is calculated as 
the price on the first day of trading minus the offer 
price divided by the offer price (Logue, Rogalski, 
Seward, & Foster‐Johnson, 2002). Underpricing is the 
most prevalent measure of short-term IPO perfor-
mance as it takes both the offer price and the stock 
price into account, while combining “the diverse per-
spectives of nearly every stakeholder group associated 
with the IPO context” (Certo et al., 2009, pp. 1363). 
Size of Offering is calculated as the number of shares 
issued during the initial public offering (Kennedy et 
al., 2006; Nam, Park, & Arthurs, 2014). VC Reputation 
was calculated using data available on Tim Pollock’s 
personal website (www.timothypollock.com/
vc_reputation.htm).  
 
Control variables. Following similar research, we 
include several control variables in order to account 
for alternative explanations (Certo, 2003). Firm Age 
and Firm Size were controlled using years since 
founding and the total employees of the firm at the 
time of the IPO (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Park & 
Patel, 2015). Risk was calculated as the total number 
of risk factors listed in the prospectus (Beatty & 
Zajac, 1994; Park & Patel, 2015). To control for the 
effect of previous lockup agreements between the 
underwriter and the VC, the average lockup was calcu-
lated by averaging the lockup length of each previ-
ous IPO that the underwriter and VC had worked 
on together. Total History refers to the reciprocal rela-
tionship between the VC and the underwriter and 
was calculated by examining the VC firm’s involve-
ment in previous IPOs. Research suggests that recip-
rocal relationships can exist regardless of whether 
the VC in question is the “lead” investor. Therefore, 
the relationship was counted if the VC firm and un-
derwriter were involved in an IPO together, regard-
less of what level of involvement the VC firm had. 
Underwriter Reputation was coded using data available 
on Jay Ritter’s personal website at the University of 
Florida. This data is based on the methodology em-
ployed by Carter et al. (Carter & Manaster, 1990; 
Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998) and subsequently com-
piled and updated by Jay Ritter. 
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Results 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations and 
correlations of the key variables in the analysis. OLS 
regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses 
presented in the article. The presence of multicollin-
earity was examined by conducting a variance infla-
tion factor analysis (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 2005; 
Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985). This examina-
tion yielded no variables with scores higher than 10 
(the highest score was 3.999), indicating that there 
are no problems of multicollinearity. Additionally, 
reports showed that skewness and kurtosis were 
within acceptable ranges.  
Table 2 presents the results of the regression 
analysis. For simplification, we include only the key 
variables in our analysis. Model 1 shows the baseline 
results of regressing lockup on the control variables. 
Model 2 to Model 4 represent the full models testing 
Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 3.  
Using Model 2 to examine Hypothesis 1, we 
found that the length of the lockup period is shorter 
when the IPO firms face greater underpricing, sup-
porting Hypothesis 1. This indicates support for the 
belief that reciprocal exchanges exist between ven-
ture capitalists and underwriters. Hypothesis 2 sug-
gests that the size of the offering will be negatively 
related to lockup. Overall, offering size had a signifi-
cant negative effect on lockup period, providing 
support for Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 was also 
supported, indicating that highly reputable VCs will 
be able to gain access to a shorter lockup period. 
This suggests that the value of the VC firm’s portfo-
lio firms has an impact on the behaviors and deci-
sions that underwriters make.  
 
 
 
 
  Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
1. Lockup Days 215.49 135.26 1           
2. Firm Age 48.92 225.24 -.015 1          
3. Risk Factors 28.64 7.85 -.168** .003 1         
4. Firm Size 928.3 2186.64 -.103 -.15 -.18 1        
5. Average Lockup 192.52 70.8 .051 -.014 -.01 .005 1       
6. Underpricing .84 1.46 -.127* .055 .12 -.044 -.036 1      
7. Size of Offering 42.22 33.66 -.323** -.042 -.07 .592** -.080 .042 1     
8. Total History 10.93 3.36 -.173** -.047 .01 -.037 -.020 .192** .014 1    
9. VC Reputation .25 19.647 .037 .007 -.03 -.035 -.068 .104** .002   .081 1   
10. UW Reputation 7.04 .233 -.555** .086 .04 .138* -.054 .180** .419** .309** -.033 1 
Notes: N = 236; * p<.05; **p<.01  
Table 1.  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control Variables         
Firm Age -.015 -.008 -.022 -.031 
Risk Factors -.172** -.169** -.074 -.078 
Firm Size -.109 -.115 .103 .097 
Average Lockup .050 .046 .017 .020 
UW Reputation -.101 -.98 -.110 .133* 
Total History -1.023* -.953* -1.027* -1.056 
Independent Variables         
Underpricing   -.127* -1.04† -.082 
Size of Offering     -.361** -.356** 
VC Reputation       -.489** 
R2 .043 .059 .133 .159 
Adjusted R2 .026 .039 .110 .130 
F-Statistics 2.596* 2.884* 5.862* 5.374** 
Change R2 .043 .016 .074 .005 
F-Statistics for Change 2.596* 3.906* 19.583** 1.289 
Notes: 
†   p<.10 
*   p<.05 
** p<.01  
Table 2. Results of Regression Analysis Predicting  
               Lockup  
5
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Taken together, the results provide strong evidence 
that reciprocal exchanges are part of the interactions 
between VCs and underwriters. However, the long-
term relationships that develop between underwrit-
ers and VCs appear to have exchanges that benefit 
the underwriter more than the VC. The results sug-
gest that while VCs maintain access to their portfolio 
firms and that even highly reputable underwriters 
will offer incentives in the form of shorter lockups 
to gain access to the portfolio firms, these incentives 
change once the relationship has been established.  
Our inquiry provides a contribution to the litera-
ture on information asymmetry as it relates to under-
pricing and also provides an understanding of the 
reciprocal exchanges between underwriters and VCs 
that impact the valuation of issuing firms. By examin-
ing the relationship history between the underwriter 
and the VC, we offer clear evidence to suggest that 
the establishment of trust may not provide the antici-
pated benefits to the issuing firm.  Given the mediat-
ed nature of the IPO market, knowing the character-
istics and background of the influential parties can be 
useful when seeking to maximize the long-term 
wealth of pre-IPO investors.   
Overall, the results suggest that the VC’s influ-
ence over portfolio firms creates a position of power 
that may not be long lasting. The establishment of 
reciprocal exchanges occurs as a result of the self-
serving desires of the underwriter and the VC, but 
reputable underwriters are able to reclaim the power 
once the relationship has been established. It may be 
that underwriters that gain access to portfolio firms 
through the influence of the VC are able to present 
different incentives other than a shorter lockup peri-
od. Regardless of the long-term benefits, the ex-
changes characterized by immediate reciprocation 
end after reputable underwriters develop a relation-
ship with the VC.   
These results provide an interesting perspective 
on the power dynamics of the parties involved in the 
IPO process.  These reciprocal exchanges indicate 
that IPOs exist in a double-mediated market and 
future exchanges are heavily influenced by the self-
serving desires of the underwriter and VC.  It is also 
interesting to note that these findings describe a 
more subtle approach to market manipulation than 
has been recognized in the past. For example, in the 
late 1990s underwriters engaged in more overt tac-
tics of market manipulation and were punished.  In 
that situation, underwriters gave VCs buy-in to at-
tractive IPOs as reciprocal exchanges for future IP-
Os (Smith, Grimes, Zuckerman, & Scannell, 2002). 
They also engaged in laddering activities wherein 
they required their institutional investors to purchase 
additional shares in the aftermarket to drive up the 
price of the shares in the focal IPO (after the shares 
were offered at a low price to start with) (Choi & 
Pritchard, 2004; Smith & Craig, 2004). Though these 
types of tactics have been resolved, it seems that un-
derwriters and VCs are still behaving opportunisti-
cally but are simply doing a better job of covering 
their actions.   
Limitations of this study point to several possi-
ble future research directions. First, the referenced 
time frame does not include many years that are 
characterized by high volatility. This suggests that 
our findings may have somewhat limited generaliza-
bility during incidents of economic turmoil. It would 
be interesting to further theorize and provide empir-
ical evidence on whether agency costs increase dur-
ing greater economic uncertainty. Second, we did 
not examine the impact that shorter lockup agree-
ments have on the investment syndicate. Future 
work could determine whether VC syndicates re-
ceive equal benefits from these reciprocal exchanges 
or if the benefits are closely tied to ownership and 
relationship history. This level of nuance wasn’t 
achieved in this study and would be an interesting 
extension for future research.    
Finally, future research could examine precisely 
when the power dynamics of the relationship be-
tween the VC and the underwriter begin to change. 
By identifying the ideal relationship history, we 
would be better able to determine when the benefits 
from working with a trusted partner are eroded by 
opportunistic behavior. Future works such as these 
would be beneficial for understanding the nuanced 
exchanges among parties in the IPO process and 
would substantively contribute to both the entrepre-
neurship and new venture financing literature.  
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